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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
The issue herein presented is RespondentiCross-Appellant's (hereinafter Respondent) 
appeal from a Memorandum Decision by Judge Frates, Washington County Magistrate, affirmed 
on appeal to the District Court, former Justice Trout presiding, denying Respondent's application 
for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and Idaho Code § 12-121. The 
Department's action against the Wiggins estate was pursued pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218, 
which is inconsistent with the clear language of a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p. 
Course of Proceedings. 
The Personal Representative was appointed in the Wiggins estate on May 22, 2009. The 
Department filed a creditor's claim in the amount of $264,674.45 on November 23, 2009. On 
November 24, 2009, the Department received a Notice of Disallowance of Claim from the Personal 
Representative. On November 30, 2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
Hearing was held on the Department's Petition on February 3, 2010. At the hearing, the Department 
entered into a stipulation which provided that in order for Vivian to have been qualified to receive 
Medicaid funds there must have been an agreement between Vivian and Emerson transmuting their 
community property cash, equally, to their respective sole and separate properties. 
The transmutation agreement determined the amount of spend-down required of Vivian's 
separate property before she could be eligible for Medicaid. Over the course of a year or two after 
the transmutation was completed, the Department determined that Vivian had spent down her entire 
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resources and because she had no interest in any other property, including Emerson's separate 
personal property, she was granted Medicaid eligibility. 
The only asset in the probate was the separate property cash of Emerson. Tr. 000022-
000024 and Tr. 000050. At no time since the transmutation did Vivian own any interest in 
Emerson's separate property, including at the time of her death or the death of Emerson. 
The Department, after acknowledging the transmutation, seeks to recover Vivian's debt 
from Emerson's sole and separate property. Vivian died and was followed in death by 
Emerson. 
In the Matter of the Estate of George D. Perry distinguished: 
The sole asset in the Wiggins probate is Emerson's separate personal property (cash). 
Unlike the case recently decided by this Court, In the Matter of the Estate of George D. Perry, 
2012 Opinion No. 118 (Idaho Supreme Court August 9, 2012) (hereinafter Perry), Vivian and 
Emerson transmuted their cash from community to separate. In Perry, a power of attorney was 
used by George to transfer Martha's interest in the home (real property) to himself leaving 
Martha with no assets. In the case at bar, both Emerson and Vivian owned an equal amount of 
money, as separate property, after the transmutation. Also, both Emerson and Vivian were 
competent to complete the transmutation and both ended up with an equal share of their 
property after transmutation. Idaho law allows transmutation of property from community to 
separate. Furthermore, the State of Idaho received the entire value of Vivian's separate 
property before making any distribution of Medicaid funds to Vivian, by Vivian using all of her 
separate personal property to pay for medical related bills until she was divested of all her 
property. 
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Finally, in Perry, Martha had once owned the home as her sole and separate property 
before she converted it to the property of both she and George, during their marriage. It was 
only after George had used the power of attorney granted to him by Martha to convey the home 
to himself that Martha and George applied for Medicaid. Medicaid funds were provided to 
Martha, never to George. George died first and thus Martha's estate had no assets from which 
Medicaid could have made a recovery. 
The Magistrate, Gregory Frates, denied the Department's claim on the basis that 
Emerson's separate property was not subject to Medicaid recovery. Tr. 000116. 
The Department appealed the Magistrate's decision to the District Court. Former 
Justice, Linda Copple Trout also denied the Medicaid claim as against Emerson's separate 
property. Tr.000427. 
The Respondent sought attorney's fees and costs against the Department and timely 
filed its appeal of the denial of attorney's fees and costs at the Magistrate and District Court 
level. Tr. 000190. The issue of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and 
Idaho Code § 12-121 are before this Court. Tr. 000260. 
Statement of the Facts: 
Emerson Wiggins ("Emerson") was born and died February 9, 
2009, at the age of 98. Vivian Wiggins ("Vivian") was born and died 
January 30, 2009, at the age of 98. 
The Department's participation III the transmutation IS entirely inconsistent with its 
subsequent effort to recover against Emerson's separate personal property. This is different than the 
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Perry case in that the Department in Perry did not participate in the transmutation, nor did the 
Department in Perry receive a benefit from the conveyance. The opposite is true in the case at bar. 
As a condition to giving Vivian medicaid, the Department required her to spend down all of her 
cash. Thus, the Department received the benefit of Vivian's separate property by delaying the start 
of medicaid funds for Vivian's care. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Attorney's Fees and Costs at the Magistrate and District Court Level. Is 
the Estate entitled to an award of attorney's fees against the Department pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-117 and/or Idaho Code § 12-121 at the Magistrate and District Court levels? 
2. Attorney's Fees on Appeal. Is the Estate entitled to attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12~1l7 and/or Idaho Code § 12-121? 
3. Perry Distinguished. Is the instant case bound by the Court's recent 
decision in In the Matter of the Estate of George D. Perry? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involves the interpretation of state and federal statutory and case law. The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391 (2008) citing State v. Hart, 135 
Idaho 827 (2001). 
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II. 
THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 12-117 
A. The Statute. Idaho Code § 12-117 was enacted to provide mandatory relief to 
parties, including estates, which have incurred attorney's fees and costs because a governmental 
agency acted without any basis in law or fact. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 reads as fo Hows: 
"In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state 
agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court 
finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law." 
B. No Facts. Idaho Code § 12-117 is applicable to the present case. The 
Department had no factual basis upon which it could make a cogent argument. There is no factual 
dispute that Emerson and Vivian entered into an agreement to and did transmute their cash from 
community property to separate property. There was no community property in the Wiggins' estate, 
no separate property of Vivian, and thus Vivian had no interest in any of estate's assets. The facts 
are also not in dispute that the Department required Vivian to spend down her separate property 
before she could obtain Medicaid. Thus, there are no facts upon which the Department could have 
been justified in bringing this recovery action. 
c. No Idaho Law. Further, as discussed in a pnor brief to this Court, the 
legislative history of Idaho Code § 56-218 only speaks of recovery from community property of the 
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non-recipient spouse. A person's separate property in Idaho is not subject to any interest in the 
spouse nor is it available to creditors of a spouse. Finally, there was no conveyance of real property 
in the case at bar and thus Wertz and Perry do not apply. Further, on the date upon which the 
Medicaid recovery statute becomes applicable i.e. date of death, Vivian had no interest or title in 
Emerson's personal separate property. Thus, no Idaho or other law justifies the Department's 
attempt to collect from Emerson's separate personal property. 
D. No Federal Law. As discussed in a prior brief to this Court, the case out of 
Minnesota, In re Estate of Barg, 752 N. W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008), clearly held that federal law did 
not permit the recovery of Medicaid funds from the non-participating spouse unless the Medicaid-
recipient spouse had an interest in or title to property of the non-participating spouse at the time of 
death. As is further discussed hereinafter, the Medicaid recovery statute only applies to conveyed 
assets. 
III. 
THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 12-121 
In addition to the foregoing analysis which shows that no law and no facts existed to permit 
the State's recovery, the Estate was clearly the prevailing party in every issue in this case at the 
Magistrate and District Court. The Estate is entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-121, because of the frivolous and unreasonable actions and positions taken by the 
Department. Ida/to Code § 12-121 confers the broad power of the court to "award reasonable 
attorney fees to a prevailing party or parties" in any civil action. An award under this code section 
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requires an analysis of IRep 54(e), which generally provides that attorney fees can only be awarded 
when the Court finds, from the facts presented, that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Respondent believes this case qualifies for 
attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
IV. 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GEORGE D. PERRY 
This Court recently rendered its opinion in In the Matter of the Estate of George D. Perry, 
2012 Opinion No. 118, dated August 9, 2012 (hereinafter Perry). Thus, previous briefing did not 
discuss the new Perry decision. Thus, in order for an award of attorney's fees to be granted by this 
Court, pursuant to both Idaho Code § 12-117 and Idaho Code § 12-121, a distinction between the 
facts of Perry and the facts of the instant case, as well as application of the legal aspects of Perry to 
the instant case is necessary. 
The factual difference between Perry and the instant case has been supplied infra at page 6. 
The first distinction is this Court's reliance on In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N. W. 2d 882 (N.D. 2000). 
While Wirtz seems to allow some tracing of assets to recover benefits paid to the recipient spouse, 
such was dicta. Wirtz holds (using the same quote by this Court in Perry): 
"We hold any assets conveyed by the recipient to the recipient's spouse before the 
recipient's death and traceable to the recipient's estate are subject to the department's 
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever held by 
either party during the marriage. 42 U.S.c. J396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which 
the deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It does not provide that 
separately-owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased recipient 
never held an interest are subject to the department's claim for recovery." 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-7 
In Perry, and in the quoted language of Wirtz, the word "conveyed' is used to describe 
traceable assets. In Perry, the asset involved was a home which was conveyed by quitclaim deed. 
The Wiggins property at issue is cash, was never conveyed, and was a "separately-owned asset in 
the survivor's estate." Thus, none of Emerson's separate personal property falls within the 
description of Wirtz. 
Furthermore, the language of this Court in the Perry decision claims to be reading all the 
language of the statute to render its decision. However, in contravention of this Court's quotes in 
Perry (that "the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none 
will be void, superfluous, or redundant" and "when the statutory language is ambiguous, the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect and the Court need not consider rules of 
statutory construction 'j, this Court necessarily "voids and makes superfluous" the very words used 
by Congress. Congress limited the time frame for recovery to the interest the recipient spouse 
owned in the non-recipient spouses estate "at the time of death". 
Also, while the Court in Perry discusses the factors used in determining if Federal law has 
preempted the activity involved, it is clear the Medicaid recovery statute does preempt state law in 
determining when and to what property the Medicaid recovery statute may be applied. 
This Court's reading of the wording of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1) as it applies to (1) timing 
and (2) the kind of assets recoverable ignores this Court's express obligation to give words of a 
statute their plain and unambiguous meaning. In fact, applying the Perry analysis to the instant 
case would render the unambiguous words such as "the individual's estate" [42 U.S.c. § 
1396p(b)(1)(4)(A)], superfluous. If the federal statute intended to allow tracing of every asset in a 
survivor's estate to a possible community property source from 1993 to the present (and beyond), 
Congress could surely have found words to place in the statute to that effect. The fact that Congress 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-8 
used "individual's estate" and "at the time of death" [42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(l)(4)(B)], to define the 
assets to be recoverable is unambiguous, not subject to statutory construction, and indeed binding on 
the States. 
For further proof of the lack of ambiguity in Congress' language, and its limitation to time 
and item to be recoverable, one need only look to the remainder of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(4)(B) 
which states in pertinent part: 
"such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." 
The word "conveyed' is used by Congress [(42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(4)(B)] as well as the 
word "through" which is followed by examples of conveyances which take effect at the time 
Congress chose to define the recoverable assets i.e. "at the time of death". Despite this Court's 
lengthy explanation in Perry why the very words used by Congress are not binding, there is simply 
no way to explain away the word "convey". "Convey" or "conveyance" are terms of art used by 
lawyers, and indeed by Congress, and cannot be explained in the instant case where cash was 
involved. Practicing for 35 years in Idaho this writer has never heard a lawyer, let alone a Judge, 
use the word "convey" or "conveyance" to describe the transfer of cash or personal property from 
one person to another. 
The words "convey" and "conveyance" are described in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th 
Edition, as follows: 
"CONVEY. To pass or transmit the title to property from one to another; to transfer 
property or the title to property by deed or instrument under seal. Used popularly in sense of 
"assign," "sale," or "transfer." Crookshanks v. Ransbarger, 80 W.Va. 21, 92 S.E. 78, 82; 
McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn.App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197, 205. (emphasis 
added). 
Convey relates properly to the disposition of real property, not personal. Dickerman v. 
Abrahams, 21 Barb., N.Y., 551, 56l. To convey real estate is, by an appropriate instrument, 
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to transfer the legal title to it from the present owner to another. Abendroth v. Greenwich, 
29 Conn. 356." (emphasis added). 
Black's defines "conveyance" as follows: 
"CONVEYANCE. In pleading. Introduction or inducement. 
In real property law. In the strict legal sense, a transfer of legal title to land. In the popular 
sense, and as generally used by lawyers, it denotes any transfer of title, legal or equitable. 
Chupco v. Chapman, 76 OkI. 201, 170 P. 259, 266. The transfer of the title ofland from one 
person or class of persons to another. Klein v. McNamara, 54 Miss. 105; Alexander v. State, 
28 Tex. App. 186, 12 S.W. 595; In re Loes' Will, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 723, 726. An instrument in 
writing under seal, (anciently termed an "assurance,") by which some estate or interest in 
lands is transferred from one person to another; such as a deed, mortgage, etc. 2 BI. Comm. 
293,295,309. (emphasis added). 
Conveyance includes every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real 
estate is created, aliened, mortgaged, or assigned, or by which the title to any real estate may 
be affected in law or equity, except last wills and testaments, leases for a term not exceeding 
three years, and executory contracts for the sale or purchase of lands. Sterns Lighting & 
Power Co. v. Central Trust Co., C.C.A. Mich, 233 F. 962, 966; Shraiberg v. Hanson, 138 
Minn. 80, 163 N.W. 1032, 1033. " (emphasis added). 
When considering that Wirtz and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) specifically use the words 
"convey" or "conveyed', it is clear to this rural practitioner that the construction by this Court in 
Perry is not applicable to the instant case. As Black's reveals, the legal definition of conveyance is 
not a transfer of personal property, but ofreal property. 
Wirtz, it appears, also clearly does not interpret the federal law to allow recovery against 
"separately-owned assets in a survivor's estate". Applying Idaho law to the instant case, and 
recognizing the language in Wirtz and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1), the separate personal property of 
Emerson Wiggins is not recoverable. 
Finally, the cost of attempting to trace non-conveyed assets would be so onerous and time 
consuming it is respectfully submitted that this Court should not impose that burden on personal 
property. As a practical matter, the burden on an estate to trace bank accounts and cash to determine 
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if personal property had, since 1993, been held as community property or quasi-community 
property (we often deal with Oregon assets in probates on the Idaho/Oregon border) would be 
beyond reasonable. Asking a surviving relative (son or daughter for example) to determine the 
possible community property interest in their parent's cash and cash-like items would make work 
for lawyers, but not necessarily make good public policy. Lastly, applying tracing to such things as 
"income from separate property" versus "rents, issues and profits of separate property" would 
delight the estate's accountant, but not personal representatives or heirs in a probate. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Department's attempted recovery against Emerson's separate personal 
property is not based on fact or law, is frivolous, and must fail. Even in light of Perry, the assets at 
issue in the instant case are not those intended (if any recovery is allowed against separate property) 
to be recoverable by the Medicaid recovery statute. Idaho's attempt to trace non-titled and non-
conveyed assets from 1993 to the present is an unreasonable interpretation of the Medicaid recovery 
statute and is an unreasonable burden on estates. 
As a result of the foregoing, the Estate is the prevailing party and entitled to attorney's fees 
and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and/or Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Respondent 
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